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THE LIABILITIES OF A PARTNER'S EXECUTOR.
Partnership is a relation between living people. If a
partnership exists between A. and B. the relation is neces-
sarily dissolved by the death of B., just as the marriage
relation between two is necessarily dissolved by the death
of one. The illustration of a partnership of two is an
illustration of the problem in its.simplest form. Where
there are many partners the situation is essentially the
same. Each sustains a relation to all the others and the
death of one destroys the integrity of the group. If the
survivors continue in business their association is a new
partnership: the old partnership is at an end. It is cus-
tomary to assert that "the firm" continues to exist after
a partner's death and "is not thereby dissolved," if there
is a provision against dissolution in the articles of part-
nership. It is also usual to declare that in such a case
"the same business" continues, notwithstanding the
event of death. The former statement is incorrect: the
latter requires analysis. If by "carrying on business"
is meant that certain persons are trading together, then,
by supposition, the business is not the same after one has
died. If : t is meant that the store or office is kept open
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by the survivors, that old orders are filled and new ones
accepted, with no outward change resulting from the
death of one partner, then the statement is unobjection-
able. The fact is that partners may by contract displace
some of the legal consequences of death, -but not all of
them. They can agree that the representatives of the
dying partner shall not for a certain time be entitled to
insist upon a liquidating sale and an accounting. They
can agree that immediately upon the grant of letters
the executor may associate himself as a partner with the
survivors, or they - can agree that the survivors shall
continue to trade as if death had not occured and that
a share of the profits shall be paid to the executor of the
dead partner. Similar provisions may be made in the will
of a partner instead of in the articles. In the latter case,
the testator is powerless to commit the survivors to any
course of conduct not acceptable to them, but the survi-
vors may make a contract with the executor upon the
lines laid down in the will. It is the purpose of this paper
to discuss the legal consequences which ensue when any
one of the above courses is adopted.
Let it be supposed that A. and B. are partners and that
B. dies leaving X. as hi executor.' The case may be
one in which neither the articles of partnership nor B's
will make any provision for the continuance of the bus-
iness after B's death. On the other hand, either in the
articles or in the will provision may have been made for
this emergency. The situation must therefore be con-
sidered first upon the supposition that such provisions
are absent, and second upon the supposition that they
are present.
I. If, in the absence of any provision in articles or
will, A. carries on the business and uses for that purpose all
the joint property belonging to himself and his late part-
ner, A. alone is liable to subsequent creditors. The exec-
utor has an equitable right to compel A. to account.
'Throughout the discussion, this mode of designating the parties
will be adhered to: A. will stand for the surviving partner, B. for the
dying partner, and X. for the dying partner's executor.
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By supposition, however, he has given to A. no authority
to continue the business and retain B's capital therein.
If A. has derived no authority from B. or from X. to use B's
capital or to bind B's estate, then he has no such author-
ity. From this it follows that the subsequent creditors
are A.'s separate creditors and have no rights against the
joint property except such rights as they work out through
A. If X. unduly delays the settlement of the firm's affairs
and A's creditors are deceived by A's continued pos-
session and use of the joint property as a basis of his
trading, the question of fraud upon creditors might arise
and upon the footing of deceit X. might be estopped from
disputing the right of creditors to seize and sell the entire
stock.' In such a situation it should seem that X.
would be liable to be surcharged in favor of the beneficiar-
ies under the will, unless the beneficiaries had acquiesced
in his conduct.
If X. deliberately contributes B.'s share in the joint
property to a new partnership venture between A. and
X. even if X. acts as executor and intends that the pro-
fits shall form part of B's estate, X. becomes a partner
and is liable without limit. Under such circumstances
X. would not be entitled to indemnity from the beneficiar-
ies in respect of losses sustained and he would be personally
liable to them for a partial or entire loss of the trust
estate.
II. Provision for the continuance of the business may
be made (as has been mentioned) either by the will of B,
or by the partnership articles. No provision in the will
can, of course, impose any obligation upon A. The only
effect that such a provision can have is upon the question
of the liability of the executor and of B's estate. If the
'The case suggested is similar to that which arises when an execu-
tor, acting under instructions contained in the will, carries on business in
his own name and induces creditors to believe that he is the real owner.
If the beneficiaries delay for a period longer than the will contemplates
to call the executor to account, an estoppel may arise against them and
in favor of creditors. This principle is recognized by Fry J. in In re Mor-
gan (Piligrem v. Pilgrem) L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 93 (1879). In this case,
however, there had been no greater lapse of time than the will contem-
plated and it was held that the beneficiaries were not estopped.
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provision is contained in the articles of partnership it
may take the form of an agreement that the business shall
be continued by the survivor for a certain period for the
benefit of the estate of the deceased or the form of a res-
ervation to each partner of the right to have his personal
representative substituted for him as a member of the
firm. These possible variations in the nature and char-
acter of the provision must be borne in mind during the
course of the following discussion.
I. CASES IN WHICH THE EXECUTOR DOES NOT BECOME
A PARTNER.
Let it be supposed that there is a provision in the arti-
cles that the survivor shall carry on the business for his
own benefit and for that of the persons entitled to share
in the estate of the deceased, or that there is a provision
in B.'s will directing or authorizing X. to allow B's share
to remain in A.'s hands for a longer or shorter time.
Here, if A. carries on the business, the question arises
whether he acts as a sole principal, under a mere contrac-
tual obligation to pay over to X. a certain proportion
of A.'s profit, or whether he is to be regarded as agent
for X. and those whom X. represents. On either view X.
will be entitled to receive the stipulated proportion of
profits and for this he will account to the beneficiaries.
The important question, however, is whether X. and
those whom he represents are individually liable to A.'s
creditors. If X. or the beneficiaries under the will are
thus liable, their liability must result from the fact that
they are partners or from the fact that A. is carrying on
the business as their agent, thus imposing upon them the
responsibilty of principals.
(I) Let the problem of X's liability be first considered.
X. certainly is not a partner. He has no powers of con-
trol over the business. Nor has he a beneficial interest,
except, possibly, to the extent of his commissions. It
is not reasonable, therefore, to work out a theory of lia-
bility on the ground that he who takes the profits of the
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business must bear the loss.' In Wild v. Davenport,2 the
articles provided that in the event of death the sum
standing to the credit of the dying partner should remain
as a part of the capital of the firm until the expiration of
the co-partnership. A subsequent creditor attempted
to hold the executors personally liable. The court were
of the opinion that the defendants were entitled to judge-
ment .
3
(2) Let the problem of the liability of the beneficiaries
next be considered. Are the beneficiaries under B.'s
will to be considered partners? Since, by supposition,
the executor has no power of control, the only difference
between his position and that of the beneficiaries is that
while he receives a share of the profits merely in order to
distribute them, the beneficiaries receive them through
him for their own use. Will any court carry the profit-
sharing test of partnership far enough to subject the bene-
ficiaries to liability? This question, it is submitted, must
be answered in the negajive. The doctrine that he who
takes part of the profit must bear the loss is applied
only to those who have themselves embarked property
in trade, and have become the proprietors in a business
enterprise. No such consequence attaches where a tes-
tator, who is himself a co-proprietor, permits his interest
in the business to remain in the hands of his surviving
associate for the purpose of earning profits for designated
beneficiaries.
It is undeniable that both executor and beneficiaries
have some of the characteristics of owners. Not only
do they receive a share of the profits, but the interest of
the dead partner is at the risk of the business. If A. were
I The discussion proceeds upon the assumption that the mere receipt
of profits, even if the profit-sharer takes beneficially, does not con-
stitute the taker a partner. It is essential that he be invested with a
proprietor's rights of control; otherwise he is not a partner. If, there-
fore, powers of control are absent in the case of an executor, it is
clear that his mere right to receive the profits can impose no liability
upon him.
248, N. J. L. 129 (1886).
See to the same effect Richer v. Poppenheysen, 39 Howard's Prac-
tice 83 (187o) and Owens v. Mackall, 33 Md. 382 (1870).
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to fail, undoubtedly the whole stock in trade would be
answerable for his debts and neither X. nor the bene-
ficiaries could compete with the creditors.' Here, then,
is a case in which the decision that no partnership
exists must be based upon the absence of the power of
control.
Having decided that X. and the beneficiaries are not
owners and therefore not partners, or part-owners, it
follows that A. is not to be regarded as their agent. To
regard A. as principal in respect of his own interest in
the business and as agent in respect of the remaining
interest, really involves the conception that the actual
owners of that remaining interest are X. and the beneficiar-
ies-a conclusion which has just been negatived. From
these considerations it results that A., the surviving part-
ner, is the sole owner of the stock in trade and the sole
proprietor of the business. He is subject to the liability
of a principal and is not to be regarded as acting as agent
for anybody. He is subject to a contractual obligation
to pay over a certain portion of. his profits to X. for the
uses of B.'s will.
(3) It follows from what has been said that, under the
facts just stated, neither X. nor the beneficiaries under
the will are liable to subsequent creditors. The question
whether B.'s share of the firm estate may be seized and
sold for their satisfaction then arises. This question
requires an affirmative answer.2 The only reasonable
I That so much of B's estate as is directed to be embarked in trade
is at the risk of the business appears from Ex parte Richardson, Buck's
Rep. 202 (I~iS); 3 Maddox, 138. In that case the executor was al-
lowed to prove in the bankruptcy of the firm only for that sum which
had been embarked in the business in excess of the limit fixed by the
tostator.
2Apart from the intention of B, it should seem that the portion of B's
estate that is left in A's hands must necessarily be at the risk of the
business. If B. were clearly to indicate an intention that his capital
should be lent to A. and a share of profits received in lieu of interest,
it is possible that effect might be given to this intention. It seems to
the writer, however, that it would be an unwise policy to allow to
the executor and those whom he represents all the advantages incident
to the partnership relation and yet to place them in the category of
creditors with a right to prove in bankruptcy for the amount of the
contribution. In Vyse v. Foster, L. R. 8 Chancery 309 (1870), the
THE LIABILITIES OF A PARTNER'S EXECUTOR. 571
interpretation of the partnership contract or the provision
of the will is that B. intended to leave his share of the firm
property at the risks of the business. In the one case, the
survivor acquires the right to pledge B's share in virtue
of the contract. In the other case, he acquires the right
in virtue of a testamentary disposition. In either aspect
of the case it is immaterial whether or not the creditors
knew of the use of B.'s property in the business. A.'s
act pledges the property whether the creditors know of
it or not.
It will be remembered that the case under discussion
is that in which there is a provision in articles or will
directing X. to allow B.'s interest to remain in the business.
but not conferring upon X. such proprietary rights in
the enterprise as suffice to make him a partner. X.
accordingly is not liable to A.'s creditors. It has also
been concluded that the beneficiaries under B.'s will are
not liable. That portion of B's estate, however, which
remains in the business is at the risk of the trade and may
be swept away at the suit of subsequent creditors.
The next problem that presents itself is whether or not
the creditors of A. can reach that portion of the estate of
B. which is not invested in the partnership. This same
problem must be solved in those cases in which articles
or will impose upon the executor such rights and duties
as actually constitute him a partner with A. Whether
X. is a partner in a given case or whether he is not, the
creditors are apt to attempt to reach B's separate estate.
The success or failure of their attempt seems not to
depend upon the status of X. It is accordingly
proposed to postpone discussion of the problem until
after the liability of an executor-partner has been
considered.
executors delayed to withdraw the testator's interest from the hands
of the surviving partners, some of the executors being themselves
members of the firm. The court treated the situation as if there had
been a loan of the interest of the deceased partner to the firm. The
real question involved, however, was whether or not one of the residu-
ary legatees who declined to accept payment of the debt, with inter-
est, was entitled to claim a share in the profits of the business.
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2. CASES IN WHICH THE EXECUTOR DOES BECOME
A PARTNER.
Turning, then, from the case in which the executor
does not become a partner, let the situation be supposed
in which it is provided, either by articles or will, that X.
as B.'s personal representative, shall be substituted as a
partner in B.'s place. In such a situation X. must have
the option either to associate himself with A., the sur-
vivor, or to decline to do so.'
If the executor elects to associate himself with A. the
question at once arises as to the extent of his liability.
He has become a co-proprietor in the business with a part-
ner's powers of control, but he will not profit by con-
ducting it, for he is subject to a duty to account to the
beneficiaries under the will. Under such circumstances,
it might be held that the executor was subject to no
personal liability but that creditors might have recourse
either to the whole estate in his hands or to such portion
of it as is embarked in the trade. On the other hand, it
might be decided that his representative capacity will
be ignored and an unlimited personal* liability enforced.
The choice between these two possible views must be made.
On the one side, there are weighty considerations arising
from the unfairness to the executor of a rule which
penalizes the discharge of duty. On the other, there is
the traditional insistence of the common law upon a
man's unlimited liability for the consequer~ces of his acts.
An examination of the cases discloses this fact: that
the problem under discussion is not really a question of
partnership law, but of the law governing executors and
administrators. In other words, the question of the
liability or immunity of an executor may present itself
when an executor carries on the business of a deceased
sole trader as well as in the case in which the business
is the business of a firm.
xz parte Garland, io Vesey, Jr. zo9, (x804); Wild v. Davenport
48 N. J. L. 129, (1886), and cases there cited.
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If a sole trader dies and appoints an executor, the case
may be one in which the will contains no provision for
carrying on the business, or it may confer upon the ex-
ecutor an authority to carry it on. It was said by Lord
Langdale, in Kirkman v. Booth,' that there must be a
distinct and positive authority given by the will itself
in order to justify an executor in carrying on a trade or
in permitting it to be carried on. This is, he said, "a
rule without exception." If, in the absence of such
authority, he carries on the business, he takes the risk
of any loss that may occur.' The risk run under such
circumstances is referred to by Lord Mansfield in Barker
v. Parker,' although the case did not directly involve the
question of the executor's personal liability.
The result of the decisions in cases where the will con-
tains an authority to continue the business is thus ex-
pressed by Fry J., in In re Morgan':
"It appears to me that the principles which regulate questions of
this sort are very clear. As I understand them, where a trustee or
executor carries on a business under the directions contained in the
will of the testator, and in that character contracts a debt, the debt is
one for which an action must be brought against the executor per-
sonally, and for which judgment must be obtained de bonis propriis
of the executor, and no action can be successfully brought against the
executor as executor, and no execution can be had de bonis testatoris,
for this very simple reason, that the debt was not the debt of the
testator. In making these observations I say nothing about the right
I ii Beav. 273 (1848).
'In Shinn's Estate, 166 Pa. 121, (1895), an administrator without
consultation with the creditors and without asking authority from
the court, invested a large sum of money belonging to the intestate in
continuing a mining enterprise. The business proved a disastrous
failure. "He might," said the court, "almost as safely have invested it
in stocks on the prospect of a rise. This was not ordinary business
sagacity or prudent management. His conduct, on the facts found by
the auditing judge, therefore, warranted the surcharge."
Of course, the risk of a surcharge may be eliminated where the con-
duct of the executor is authorized or acquiesced in by the beneficiaries.
Poole v. Munday, 103 Mass. 174. No amount of acquiescence on their
part, however, can displace the primary legal liability of the executor
to creditors. This liability, as appears from the discussion in the text,
exists even where a clear authority to carry on the business is contained
in the will.
3 Term Rep. 287 (1786).
'L. R. is Ch. Div. 93 (1879); cited also as Pillgrem v. PiUgrem.
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which the executor undoubtedly has to come against the assets of the
testator."'
The position of the executor of a partner, where a
business is conducted by the executor under the authority
of the will, is similar to the position of the executor. of
a sole trader under like circumstances. Perhaps the argu-
ment based on the hardship of a rule which penalizes the
executor may be urged with more force in partnership
cases than in others. If the creditors know that the execu-
1 The point actually decided in the case from which the extract is
taken was that a judgment creditor of the executor, where the debt was
incurred in carrying on the business under the authority of the
will, was not entitled to take in execution a leasehold belonging to the
estate and used in the way of trade. It is to be noted, however, that
the executor was carrying on the business in his own name.
It had previously been decided in Owen v. Delemeare, L.R. 15 Equity,
134, 27 T. L.N.S. 647, (1873), that an administration bill filed by credi-
tors must be dismissed on the ground that the true remedy of the com-
plainants was by an action at law, against the executors personally,
although they had contracted the debts in carrying on business as
directed by the will. The Vice-Chancellor, Sir James Bacon, remarked:
"Ex pane Garland and ex pane Richardson show that the executor is
liable for every shilling on every contract he enters into."
Following on Owen v. Delemeare, came the decision in Fairlanb v.
Percy, 32 L.T.N.S. 405, (1875,) L.R. 3 P. & D. 217. In that case the
testator appointed executors and directed them to allow his widow
to carry on the business. They renounced and she administered and
carried on the business. On her death, administration was granted to
a creditor of the widow on the theory that he was an equitable creditor
of the estate. Sir James Hannen observed "there can be no doubt
that originally Martha Percy was the legal debtor of the plaintiff's
firm, and that had she been solvent they would have been bound to
look to her estate for payment, and, that no claim could have been
made against the estate of the deceased." He added that the creditors,
in addition to the individual responsibility of the persons ordering
the goods, may claim in equity against the estate to the extent that
it was authorized to be used in the business.
The following is a summary of the most important American cases
upon the point under discussion:
Stedman v. Feidler, 2o N. Y. 464 (1859).
The administrator of a deceased part owner of a vessel, if taking
part in her running, may render himself personally responsible for
supplies furnished her, but cannot bind the estate of the intestate.
Lovellv. Field, 5 Vt. 218 (1833).
Administrators held liable as individuals for the debts they con-
tract while administrators, though the contract be for the benefit of
the estate.
Fitzhugh v. Fitzhugh, ix Gratt. 300 (1854).
Assumpsit by a creditor against executors. There were three counts,
one for materials furnished, one for services rendered and one for
money paid for the use of the defendants as executors. Held that the
promises set forth in the two first counts could create no liability on
the executors as such, but charged them only personally. Under the
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tor is trading with the survivor only in his capacity as
executor, it may be said that they are not entitled to com-
plain if they are denied the right to satisfy their claims out
of the executor's private estate. In order to reach a con-
clusion favorable to the executor, however, it is necessary
to oppose the tendency of the common law to hold every
third count facts might be shown which would justify a recovery de
bonis testatoris. There was, therefore, a misjoinder of counts in the
declaration. A judgment overruling a demurrer to the declaration
was reversed.
McKay v. Royal, 7 Jones L. (52 N.C.) 426 (r86o).
In an action by an attorney against an executrix for professional
fees, it was held that the debt created by her employment of counsel,
after testator's death, to advise and assist her in the discharge of her
duties was a personal debt for which plaintiff was entitled to judgment
against her personally.
Wade v. Pope, 44 Ala. 690 (1870).
Upon a bill filed against the executrix and devisees of a deceased
trader by one who had a claim for services rendered at the request
of the executrix who was given power by the will to carry on
the testator's farming business as it had been carried on in his lifetime,
held that bill must be dismissed as the plaintiff's right was to bring
an action at law against executrix in her individual capacity. This he
had actually done, but the judgment obtained by him remained un-
satisfied.
Austin v. Munro, 47 N.Y. 36o (1872).
In an action against the executors it was held that a contract made
by executors in form as such in consideration of services to be rendered
in vindicating and asserting their claims to property in their represent-
ative capacity and for the benefit of the estate they represent, does
not bind the estate or create a charge upon the assets in the hands of
the executors.
Morrow v. Morrow,%2 Tenn. Ch. 549 (1875).
In a proceeding by a surety of decedent to be allowed priority out of
assets of the estate over creditors whose debts had been created since
testator's death, it was held that the debts created by testator were to
be first satisfied out of the assets of the estate in preference to debts
created after his death in carrying on a business under the provisions
of his will, even though the will directed that all his property should be
responsible for the debts thus incurred.
Cloptot v. Gholson, 53 Miss. 466 (1876).
Upon a bill filed by attorneys who had rendered services at the
request of the administrator to reach the assets of the estate, it was
held that the plaintiffs need not first establish their claim at law,
provided they could so amend their bill as to show the impossibility of
obtaining payment from the administrator individually. The court
regarded them as entitled to be subrogated to the rights of*the adminis-
trator against the estate.
Liable v. Ferry, 32 N.J.Eq. 791 (188o).
A, a brewer, directed that his executors should allow the business
to be carried on until in their judgment it ought to be sold. He desig-
nated one of his sons as the manager of the business. The son man-
aged the business under the authority of the executors, and after his
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man to an unlimited liability for the consequences of his
own acts, leaving him to obtairy such indemnity as he
can from those for whose benefit he was acting.'
If the executor were liable only in his representa-
tive capacity, he would be entitled to an unlimited in-
demnity against the estate of his testator. Since, how-
death they carried it on themselves. The complainants furnished
malt to the executors. They filed their bill and sought a decree declar-
ing that all the property of the testator in the hands of the executors
was chargeable with the indebtedness due the complainants and should
be sold, for the payment of the same. The Chancellor made a decree
as prayed for. On appeal the decree was reversed. The bill contained
no direct averment of the insolvency of the executors, but the evidence
disclosed their inability to meet .the complainants' claim and no
objection was made to the want of allegation of some specific reason for
the interference of equity. The real question therefore was as to the
extent to which the executors themselves could receive from the
estate indemnity for the debts incurred; it being conceded that to this
extent the creditors might avail themselves in equity of the right of
the executors. It was held that certain of the property which the
complainants sought to sell was neither embarked by the testator in
the business before his death nor designated to be so embarked there-
after, and that there was nothing, therefore, sufficient to induce the
court "to postpone legatees and devisees until the posthumous ven-
tures of the testator are ended."
Willis v. Sharp, 113 N.Y. 586 (x889).
In an action against an executor to subject the general assets of the
estate to liability for goods sold and delivered to him as such it was
held that a testator may bind his general assets for all of his debts,
and where such intent finds expression in his will, in case of the insol-
vency of the executors, the general assets may be made liable in equity
for the debts. But where such an intent does not appear a creditor
'The decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in National
State Bank of Camden v. Pennock, 2 Monahan, 166, (1889,) appears at
first sight to be a case favorable to the immunity of an executor-
partner. Upon examination, however, it will be found that the case
was really decided upon the ground that there was no evidence from
which a jury would be justified in inferring that the executors had
become partners with the survivors and no evidence (as to one of the
executors) that there had been any such "holding-out" as would
suffice to raise an estoppel. The facts were as follows:
B., by his will, directed his executors to continue his interest in a
partnership. After B.'s death a notice, signed with the firm name,
was sent to customers that B.'s interest would remain as before and
the business be continued in the old name by the surviving partners
and the executors. Two of the three executors of B. took no part in
the conduct of the business, and one of these two, C., B.'s widow, knew
nothing of the notice, but received from the firm the same weekly
allowance B. had received. In an action by A. against the surviving
partners and B.'s executors, as partners, to fix an individual liability
of the executors, on notes given in the firm name after B.'s death,
nonsuit, on the ground that, under the evidence, defendants were not
liable as a firm. Refusal to take off nonsuit affirmed.
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ever, he is liable without limit for acts done by him in
carrying on business, either as a sole trader or as an as-
sociate of the surviving partner, it follows that his right
of indemnity is limited to that portion of the stock em-
barked in the business by the testator, or directed by the
will to be so embarked by the executor.' Where an ex-
ecutor has acted in good faith, there is so much fairness
in his plea for full indemnity that a court should be astute
to find some justification in the facts of a particular case
for postponing distribution to the beneficiaries under the
will until the executor has first been made whole.2
has no remedy except to pursue the assets embarked in the trade or
business at the time of the death.
Munzor's Est. 4 Misc. Rep. (N.Y.Surrogate) 374 (z893).
Upon exceptions to the account of an administrator it was held that
where the business in which the decedent has been engaged is con-
ducted by his administrator, the latter continues the same at his in-
dividual risk and as his individual business, being obliged only to
credit the estate with whatever profit is derived therefrom.
Strong cases emphasizing the individual liability of the executor on
contracts made by him after the death of the testator are the following:
Taylor v. Mygatt, 26 Conn. 184 (1857).
McFarlin v. Stins(n, 56 Ga. 396 (1876).
Davis v. French, 20 Me. 21 (1841).
Sumner v. Williams, 8 Mass. x62 (18ix).
1Ex parte Garland, io Vesey Jr. 109, (1804).
Ex parte Richardson, Buck's Rep. 202 (i818); 3 Maddox 138.
In re Morgan, L.R. x8, Ch. Div. 93 (1879).
Wild v. Davenport, 48 N.J.L. 129 (1886).
Liable v. Ferry, 32 N.J.Eq. 791 (i88o).
In re Johnson, L.R. 15 Ch. Div. 548 (288o).
2 B. died in 1883 owing C. and leaving a will wherein he empowered
X., his executor, to continue his business and employ therein his
estate. C. was promptly informed of the facts and acquiesced in such
continuance of the business, which, however, was unsuccessful and
three years later C. brought an action for the administration of the
estate wherein he asked that the assets of the business be applied in
payment of debts due by B. at the time of his death in priority to
any claim for indemnity by X. or the persons with whom he had
dealt, which prayer was allowed by the court below as to that portion
of the estate existing at B.'s death. On appeal the House of Lords
was of opinion, reversing the court below, that as the business had been
carried on for the benefit and with the consent of C., X. was entitled
to indemnity to the full amount of the debts incurred in carrying on
the business. Dowse v. Gorton, '91 Ap. Cases 19o, Herschell, J.
"I think it is clear that where a business has been carried on under
such an authority as was conferred upon the executors by the will of
this testator, they would be entitled to a general indemnity out of
the estate as against all persons claiming under the will. But I take
it to be equally clear that they could not by reason only of such author-
ity maintain this right against the creditors of the testator." Per
Herschell, J., in above case.
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3. THE RIGHTS OF CREDITORS AGAINST THE GENERAL
ESTATE.
The last question for discussion is that referred to
above: whether creditors of A, the surviving partner,
or of A, and X. as partners, can reach that' portion of
B's estate which is not embarked in the business. This
question may present itself either where B's separate
estate is still in X's hands, or where there has been a
total or partial distribution to the beneficiaries. Agaii,
the case may be one in which X. is acting under the pro-
visions of partnership articles or merely under the di-
rections contained in B's will. In case the articles or
will expressly limit the liability of the estate to the sum
embarked in the business, it seems that the limitation
will be enforced.' Where X. is a partner and liable as
such, the conclusion just stated causes no difficulty.
Where X. is not a partner, however, the curious spectacle
is presented of a limited partnership between A. and
the estate of B, the liability of the estate being limited
to the amount of the contribution.
The next case is that in which there is no expressed
provision, either in articles or will, that the liability of the
estate shall be limited to the amount embarked in the
business. It is obvious that either of two rules is ap-
plicable in such a case. It might be declared that in
the absence of a restriction the whole estate is to be re-
garded as placed at the risks of the business.2 Or it
1 Ex pane Garland, zo Vesey Jr. xo9 (18o4).
Liable v. Ferry, 32 N.J.Eq. 791 (x88o).
Wild v. Davenpor, 48 N. J. L. 129 (r886).
2Laughlin v. Lorenz, 48 Pa. 275, (1864). A. and B., partners, cove-
nanted that, on death of one, the business should be continued by
the survivor till August first next ensuing. B. died in October, z854;
A. continued the business till August 1, 1855, when a new firm was
formed, composed of A., of C., a son of B., and of one of B.'s adminis-
trators. The three wound up the affairs of the old firm, thereby be-
coming firm creditors. On bill filed by the new firm's assignee of the
debt due by the old firm to the new for accounting between the firms,
held that the covenant for the continuation of the partnership was
enforceable against the separate estate of B; and a decree for the com-
plainant was affirmed. Agnew J., who delivered the opinion discussed
the subject as follows:
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might be decided that in the absence of any provision
extending A's authority it should be regarded as limited
to that portion of the estate already embarked in the
business.' If the latter view is taken, a case of doubt
"It is urged that the individual estate of Lorenz is not liable for
any debts contracted by-the surviving partner in carrying on the
business after his death. We cannot assent to the proposition that a
covenant for the continuation of a partnership for a reasonable period
after death, is not binding on the estate of the dying partner, if as-
sented to and carried out by the personal representatives. The cov-
enant descends upon all who take the estate by succession, and will
justify his continuing the business, whatever may be his own right
to refuse to continue and to incur thereby personal liabilities as a
partner. But the point has been solemnly decided upon full argument
and mature consideration by this Court in Gratz v. Bayard, ii S. &
R. 41, that a partnership may be continued after death by an agree-
ment to this effect, and that in such case death does not work a dis-
solution. To the authorities therein referred to, we may add Toller on
Executors 166-7; Collyer on Part. 5, 6, 120, 12i; Story on Part., par.
196; Schofield v. Eichelberger, 7 Peters 594; Burwell v. Mandeville,
2 How. 76; 2 Williams on Executors 1226-7, 1243-4. It flows as a
corollary from this proposition that the assets of the deceased partner
are liable to the debts created in the business, either generally or
specifically, according to the nature and extent of the fund devoted to
the continuance of the partnership.
"In Toller's Law of Executors 166-7, it is said the articles may con-
tain a proviso for continuing the partnership, or the testator may by
his will direct his executors to carry on his trade after his death, either
with his general assets, or appoint a specific fund to be severed from the
general mass of his property for that purpose. This is the solution of
all the cases cited in the paper book as adverse to the proposition
stated. Burwell v. Mandeville, 2 How. 560; Ex parte Garland, xo
Vesey i io; and Pitkin v. Pitkin, 7 Conn. 307, are all instances of
partnership continued by will, and specific portion only of the estate
appropriated to the continuance. Instead of denying the principle
that the general assets may be liable, it is admitted in its full breadth,
and in each case the decision is put upon the extent of the fund or
portion of the assets devoted to the continuation of the partnership.
T he only difference between these cases and Ex pane Richardson, 3
Madd. 138, is, that in this last case the partnership agreement pro-
vided if one should die, he should name in his will a successor to con-
tinue business on behalf of his estate, and the partner dying appointed
his executors. But the decision in that case was put expressly upon
the ground that all that was meant to be left to carry on the trade,
was the capital invested, and that in all beyond the executrix acted
in breach of her trust. It was also a fact in the case that the two execu-
tors who were appointed in the will jointly with the executrix, refused
to carry on the partnership, and renounced in consequence of her
determination to proceed with it.
"In the present case neither the covenant nor the will of Lorenz
limited the fund to be made liable by the continuation of the partner-
ship business after his decease, and we discover nothing therefore to
restrain the general liability of his estate."
'Smith v. Ayer, 101 U. S. 320, 1879.
Jones v. Walker, 103 U. S. 444, x88o.
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will be resolved against the authority of the survivor to
pledge more than the property already in his hands'
In Blodgett v. American National. Bank 2 the right of
executors, continuing a business in accordance with the
partnership articles,, to pledge the entire assets of the
estate for the debts of the firm was sustained. The
court held that under the articles each partner's liability
was unlimited and such liability continued without
change after death. Without expressly dissenting from
the decisions3 in which subsequent creditors of a partner-
ship continued after death of a member have been con-
fined to the assets embarked in the business by the- part-
ner when living, it was pointed out that such cases were
those in which the business had been continued under
testamentary provisions without any contract in rela-
tion thereto.
Let it be supposed that X., the executor, has distributed
all of B.'s estate excepting that which is left in A.'s hands.
The distributees are either general legatees who will re-
ceive nothing more from the estate, or they are residuary
legatees, whose shares will be increased from the profits
of the business. Can either or both of these classes of dis-
tributees be made to refund all or part of the amount re-
ceived by them for the purpose of answering the demands
of A.'s creditors? In Hankey v. Hammock,' it appears
IBurwell v. Mandeville's Exr. 2 Howard, 560, 1844.
2 Articles of partnership between A. and B. provided that the part-
nership should not be dissolved by B.'s death but that his executor
should act in his place. Each partner was to be credited with the
amount invested and receive interest thereon. B. died leaving X.
his executor but making no further provision with regard to the
partnership. The business was continued and X. pledged other assets
of the estate for partnership debts. A bill filed by beneficiaries of the
will to compel the surrender of such pledged assets was dismissed.
Decree affirmed. Blodgett v. American National Bank, 49 Conn. 9
(i88i), Pardee, J.
3 A. and B. were partners. B. died leaving X. his executor and direct-
ing that his interest in the firm should remain and the business be con-
ducted as before. Several years later X. pledged a part of B.'s estate not
.included in the business at the time of B.'s death, to secure funds for the
firm. In a proceeding to compel a restitution of the estate so pledged
the court below dismissed the bill. Decree reversed. Smith v. Ayer,
1x U. S. 320 (r879), Field, J.
I Cook's Bankruptcy Law, p. 67, 5 th Ed. and 3 Maddox Rep. at
148, Note.
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to have been decided that legatees irrespective of their
class must refund under such circumstances. This de-
cision was, however, disapproved by Lord Eldon in Ex
parte Garland,' and the law may be regarded as settled
the other way.2  In Jones v. Walker an attempt was
made to recover from residuary legatees the amounts
paid them from year to year as profits of a partnership
business carried on by the survivor in accordance with
directions of the decedent's will. The court was of the
opinion that, under the facts there shown, no such liability
existed. If however, as pointed out by Miller, J., the
dividends paid had not been declared in good faith or had
not been really earned or if they had diminished the
capital or if, when they were paid, debts existed which
would have been left without means of payment, the
persons sharing in the dividends would probably have been
liable to the creditors to the extent of the money so
received.
George Wharton Pepper.
I B. died leaving a will wherein he directed his business to be carried
on by his executor X., who was authorized to withdraw for that pur-
pose a certain portion of the estate. X. subsequently became a bank-
rupt and a petition was presented for the purpose of having the whole
estate subjected to the debts contracted by X. Prayer refused. Ex
pante Garland. zo Ves. Jr. 109 (1803), Eldon, L. C.
'See ex pare Richardson, 3 Maddox, 138, 1818. Pitkin v. Pikin,
7 Conn. 306, 1828.
3 B., partner of A., died leaving a will wherein he directed that his
capital and interest in the firm should be continued and be chargeable
for its debts and liabilities but that his other property should not be so
chargeable. It was further provided that the profits should from
time to time be paid over to certain legatees. The firm was subse-
quently declared bankrupt and a bill filed by the assignee to subject
the general assets not embarked in the business to the payment of
partnership debts and to recover from the residuary legatees the
sums paid them as profits earned by B.'s interest in the firm. The
original capital had not been diminished and at the time the dividends
had been paid there remained ample funds for the payment of their
existing debts, which were in fact fully paid. Decree dismissing bill
affirmed. Jones v. Walker, xo3 U.S. 444 (188o), Miller, J.
